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Purpose. In many contexts in which high-stakes lies occur (such as security settings or
the courtroom), observers must evaluate whether the stories they hear are credible.
However, little research has evaluated the ability of observers to detect high-stakes lies,
nor the influence of the manner in which the deception is presented on judgment
accuracy. This study investigated whether the presentation modality of high-stakes lies
influences both explicit and implicit deception detection accuracy.
Methods. Participants (N = 231) were randomly assigned to one of four presentation
modalities: audiovisual, video-only, audio-only, or transcript-only and asked to evaluate
the honesty of targets – half of whom were sincere and half deceptive killers – making a
plea for the return of a missing relative both explicitly (direct lie/truth decision) and
implicitly (via emotional reactions).
Results. Overall, explicit deception detection accuracy was slightly above chance
(M = 52.5%), and honest pleas were accurately identified at a higher rate than deceptive
pleas. Although there were no differences in overall accuracy across modality, observers
reading transcripts exhibited a truth bias, which resulted in them detecting truthful pleas
at a higher rate than with the other groups. Although explicit accuracy was at the level of
chance, implicit reactions indicated that observers were able to unconsciously discern
liars from truth-tellers.
Conclusions. Despite the high-stakes nature of the lies presented here, they were
difficult to detect. Lies presented via written language were missed at a higher rate when
assessed using explicit but not implicit judgments.
Although deception is a pervasive social phenomenon, observers in psychological
experiments are typically only able to detect lies at or slightly above the level of chance
(e.g., Bond&DePaulo, 2006; Hartwig&Bond, 2011). To date,most studies examining the
validity of deception detectionhave used low-stakes lies as stimuli. However, the results of
such studies may not generalize to forensic contexts, such as interrogation settings or the
courtroom, where lies, and their evaluation, can have grave consequences for all those
involved (e.g., ten Brinke & Porter, 2012). While members of the judiciary and law
enforcement appear confident in their ability to detect such lies (e.g., Porter & ten Brinke,
2009), research suggests that their performance may be similar to that of laypersons
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(e.g., Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991; Vrij, Mann, Robbins, & Robinson, 2006). For example,
one study examining the ability of the police to evaluate the veracity of high-stakes targets
found that their performance was at the level of chance (Vrij & Mann, 2001).
Conversely, some work suggests that deception detection with high-stakes deceivers
may be better than that documented in research with low-stakes deceivers. Mann, Vrij,
and Bull (2004) had police officers attempt to differentiate truths and lies told by suspects
during videotaped police interviews. In this case, accuracy rates for both truths and lies
were around 65%, considerably higher than other studies with low- or no-stakes targets.
Similarly, in a meta-analytic study of 31 groups of police officers in eight countries,
O’Sullivan, Frank, Hurley, and Tiwana (2009) found that police officers detected
high-stakes lies 67% of the time. As these high-stakes lies are more relevant to professional
lie-catchers, and more ecologically valid, it is important to understand why individuals
may bemore accurate inmaking veracity decisions for lies of greater consequence. To this
end, these studies addressed only the accuracy rates of observers assessing high-stakes
deception, and did not investigate the cues that may have improved, or impaired, their
ability to identify deception. As attempts to develop empirically-based training to identify
high-stakes lies continues (e.g., Shaw, Porter, & ten Brinke, 2013), a better understanding
of the cues that observers are using ‘naturally’ to make their decisions is critical and will
inform the training of those given the important job of identifying high-stakes lies.
To understand the differences in accuracy in detecting low- versus high-stakes lies, it is
necessary to elucidate the unique observable cues that liars display in high-stakes
contexts. These liars ‘leak’ both verbal and non-verbal cues to their deceit (e.g., DePaulo
et al., 2003; Frank & Ekman, 1997). For example, in a study of a sample of missing person
pleas, ten Brinke and Porter (2012) discovered that liars provided cues to emotional
deception through insincere emotional expressions, brief instances of emotional leakage
(e.g., smirking when attempting to appear sad), and used more hand illustrators than
truth-tellers. Further, liars also implicated themselves through their language, using fewer
words and more tentative words than those giving a genuine plea.
There are a number of possible explanations for the leakage of observable cues to
high-stakes deception. For example, evidence of deception may be present due to
increased cognitive load. In relation to lying, cognitive load is increased when a liar must
tell a convincing lie while controlling their verbal and non-verbal behaviour (see Vrij,
Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2008; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). Some indications of high
cognitive load occur in speech, such as providing fewer details, more speech hesitations,
longer pauses, and in body language, such as decreased illustrator use (Vrij, 2005; Vrij &
Mann, 2001; Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 2010). A liar also may attempt to disassociate
him/herself from the lie, either to keep attention from him/herself or relieve him/herself
of the guilt associated with the transgression. This psychological distancing may emerge
in the liar’s speech patterns with the use of tentative words, negative emotional words,
or reduced use of first person pronouns (Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, & Richards,
2003). An individual’s emotional arousal may lead to behavioural manifestations when
lying. This is related to Darwin’s inhibition hypothesis, and the inability of an individual
to completely mask or fake strong emotions (Ekman, 2003). When an individual is
engaged in a lie, particularly a high-stakes lie, he/she attempts to mask his/her true
emotions and simulate another emotion. This is likely to lead to facial ‘leakage’, which
indicates discrepancies between what they should be feeling and what they are actually
feeling (e.g., ten Brinke & Porter, 2012). Despite the abundance of cues potentially
available, lie catchers continue to perform at chance when asked to differentiate liars
from truth-tellers.
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An interesting recent proposal is that observersmay do better at evaluating this type of
deception ‘indirectly’ versus being directly asked ‘is that person lying?’ (see ten Brinke,
Stimson, & Carney, 2014). ten Brinke et al. (2014) evaluated this using two measures of
unconscious deception detection, an implicit association task and a semantic classifica-
tion task, designed to assess the relationship between honest/deceptive targets and
truthful/untruthful words in addition to explicit veracity assessments. On both tasks,
participants performed below chance on explicit veracity assessments and were
significantly more accurate at indirectly identifying deceptive targets. These results are
congruent with a growing body of evidence demonstrating the implicit ability to detect
deception (e.g., Albrechtsen, Meissner, & Susa, 2009; Hartwig & Bond, 2011).
Other indirect approaches to lie detection have involved asking observers to assess for
particular verbal and non-verbal behavioural patterns (see Granhag, 2006 for a review).
For example, having participants identify speakers who appear to be ‘thinking hard’
yielded more accurate lie/truth categorizations than explicit attempts at lie detection
(Vrij, Edward, & Bull, 2001; also see Anderson, DePaulo, & Ansfield, 2002). In a similar
vein, this study explored for the first time whether sincere and deceptive emotional
communication in a high-stakes context might unconsciously elicit differing emotional
responses in observers, even if the same observers were poor at assessing honesty
explicitly.
Presentation modality
Considering themany types of cues that may be present throughout a high-stakes lie (e.g.,
verbal, facial expressions, body language), it is important to consider themanner inwhich
the lie is presented (e.g., the number and types of cues available) to the lie-catcher. The
manner in which a target is presented to an observer has implications for the observer’s
attention to, comprehension of, and memory for, the target (e.g., Black, Woodworth, &
Porter, 2014; Walther, 2012). That is, varying types of media differ in the quality and
quantity of information that they convey (e.g., Daft&Lengel, 1986).Media richness theory
(MRT) posits that media-rich presentation modalities (e.g., media that provides more
communication channels, such as thosewith audio and video information) aremost useful
when the observer is attempting to evaluate more ambiguous messages and, conversely,
that media lacking in rich cues (e.g., text only) are most helpful when attempting to
evaluate more simple or concretemessages (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Gilman &Turner, 2001;
Purdy, Nye,&Balakrishnan, 2000). As the evaluation of a target’s veracity is an ambiguous,
complex task, MRTmight suggest that presenting the observerwith amedia-richmodality
would convey more information, allowing the observer to make a more informed
decision.
On the contrary, there is evidence that media-rich presentations overwhelm the
limited cognitive resources that observers possess, reducing the attention that they can
afford each of the channels of communication presented, resulting in a loss of information
(Dennis & Kinney, 1998). Research comparing observers’ ability to recall information
learned across various presentation modalities (e.g., text only, text-audio, and
text-audio-video) has shown that richer media results in less acquired information
(Rockwell & Singleton, 2007). Further, a second line of work suggests that more
information may be gleaned from text alone (a media-lean presentation modality) versus
audio and audio-visual modalities (Furnham, Benson, & Gunter, 1987; Salomon & Leigh,
1984). This is attributed to the cognitive focus required to read text rather than listen to
audio or view a video; increased focus results in increased attention and memory
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(Salomon & Leigh, 1984). It also is possible that the assessment of visual communication
(in-person or via video) versus thewrittenword is more engaging and could be associated
with higher motivation to be accurate. Considering deception, this line of research
suggests that the complex task of observing both audio and video communication by a
target may inundate one’s cognitive capacity to the point of distraction and that simply
reading a transcript alone may allow an observer to focus solely on the plea, improving
their ability to evaluate the target.
The role of presentation modality has received little attention in relation to detecting
deception and those studies that have been done have evaluated low-stakes lies. For
example, a meta-analysis of deception detection accuracy reported that lie-catchers are
least accurate when making decisions based on video alone (Bond & DePaulo, 2006).
Similarly, Burgoon, Blair, and Strom (2008) considered the influence of presentation
modality on deception detection for a mock theft and also found that lie-catchers were
least accurate in the video-only presentation modality andmost accurate when presented
with audio-only clips (also see Mann, Vrij, Fisher, & Robinson, 2008). This may be due to
a lack of media-rich cues or the liar’s ability to distract the lie-catcher with non-verbal
behaviour (e.g., illustrators, manipulators; Levine et al., 2011). Indeed, in addition to the
role of cognitive load in relation to the type of media presented to an observer, there also
are unique considerations with the types of communication involved in high-stakes lies.
Specifically, the presentation of non-verbal information increases the amount of social
information that must be processed, which could increase the likelihood of an erroneous
judgment (Levine et al., 2011). This suggests that tasks focusing only on linguistic cues
may yield better results as the listener is exposed to limited social information. This also
is supported by Davis, Markus, and Walters (2006) study that found that observers were
most accurate when presented with lies in an audio-only format and least accurate when
assessing transcripts. Contrary to these findings, Porter, Campbell, Stapleton, and Birt
(2002) examined the influence of modality when evaluating honest/deceptive emotional
memories and found no effect of presentation modality. The role of presentation
modality in assessments of high-stakes lies remains unclear. Interestingly, in light of some
of the above research and many miscarriages of justice in which ‘demeanour’ evidence
was considered by the judge, there have been informal discussions within the legal
community about whether witnesses in court should be heard but not seen to prevent
jurors from being distracted by non-verbal behaviour such as nervousness or gaze
aversion.
The current study
Little research has evaluated the ability to detect high-stakes lies and whether deceptive
‘leakage’ in verbal versus non-verbal behaviour influences perceived honesty. This study
was the first to assess the role of presentation modality in deception detection accuracy
using powerful, high-stakes lies. Although the research on the influence of presentation
modality is mixed, most work suggests that the inclusion of multiple communication
channels is a detriment to the evaluation of the content. As such, it is hypothesized that
observers will detect deception most accurately in the media-lean modalities (e.g.,
transcript-only and/or audio-only). Further, social information theory and previous
research suggest that observers are often distracted by non-verbal behaviour resulting in
the hypothesis that observers will be least accurate at detecting deception in the
video-only and audio-video modalities (e.g., Burgoon et al., 2008; Levine et al., 2011;
Mann et al., 2008).
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This study also was among the first studies to assess the accuracy of explicit versus
implicit veracity decisions. The implicit measure of veracity employed was the observers’
degree and type (positive or negative) emotional reactions to honest and deceptive pleas.
As there is mounting evidence for the merit of unconscious decisions, it is hypothesized
that sincere emotional communication in a high-stakes contextmight unconsciously elicit
stronger emotional responses related to sympathy in observers than when they observe a
fraudulent story, even if the same observers were poor at assessing honesty explicitly.
Further, it also was hypothesized that emotional responses (such as sadness and
sympathy) elicited in observers when processing a target’s story would be more
influential in audio-video condition, given that these channels provide a wealth of
information (e.g., both verbal and non-verbal cues).
Method
Participants
Participantswere 231 undergraduate students, 76men (M = 19.73 years, SD = 1.77) and
155 women (M = 19.86 years, SD = 2.08), from a Canadian university, who participated
in the study in return for course credit. Of the 231 participants, 168 identified as
Caucasian, 26 identified as Asian, and 36 identified as ‘other’ (e.g., Aboriginal, East Indian,
and Hispanic).
Materials
The stimuli used for this study were ‘pleader videos’ gathered from news agencies in
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States (for a more detailed
description see ten Brinke & Porter, 2012; ten Brinke, Porter, & Baker, 2012). Twenty
videos depicting individuals who made televised pleas for the safe return of, or
information regarding, a missing family member were used as target stimuli. Of these, 10
were honest and 10 were deceptive (i.e., guilty of the missing person’s murder), as
indicated by overwhelming incriminating evidence. Each video was separated into
different components to allow for varied presentation modality; the speech of the
pleaders was transcribed, the audio soundtrack was exported, and the audiovisual was
kept intact. This allowed for four different presentation modalities: audiovisual,
video-only (sound muted), audio-only, and transcript-only (creating 80 possible clips).
The original plea videos were edited to include only the direct plea in which the pleader
spoke directly to (1) the perpetrator, (2) the missing person, and/or (3) the public. The
videos were closely focused on the pleaders themselves, displaying only their upper body
and face. Together the edited videos had an average length of 17 s, with a range of 8–27 s
(an average of 17.3 s for deceptive pleaders and 17.8 s for honest pleaders). Each of these
videos has been previously analyzed for observable cues to emotion deception in the face,
body language, and in language (ten Brinke & Porter, 2012).
The plea video evaluation form, designed specifically for this study,was comprised of a
dichotomous rating of honesty/deception and a rating of the possible emotions elicited
(e.g., happiness, sadness, fear, disgust, anger, surprise, and sympathy on a 7-point Likert
scale) from the clip. To ensure internal consistency, Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities were
calculated for each item included in the evaluation form. Reliabilities ranged from .89 to
.97, above the acceptable cut-off of .07 (see Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994), and were thus
deemed appropriate for use in subsequent analyses. Additionally, a demographics
questionnaire was completed.
Detecting high-stakes lies 5
Procedure
Observers were randomly assigned to one of the four possible conditions: audiovisual,
video-only, audio-only, or transcript-only. First, each participant filled out the demo-
graphics questionnaire, and then watched/listened to/or read all 20 clips (in the same
order that also had been randomly determined) and filled out the plea video evaluation




Observer data, organized by condition, are provided in Table 1. The total mean for overall
accuracy was 52.53% (SD = 9.75), significantly above the level of chance, t(230) = 3.95,
p < .001. A one-way ANOVA to evaluate the first hypothesis, whether condition affected
overall accuracy, was not significant, F(3, 227) = 0.91, p = .44.1 The strength of the
relationship between presentation modality and overall accuracy, as assessed by partial
eta-squared, was low and accounted for only 1.2% of the overall variance in detection
accuracy.
Explicit accuracy for honest versus deceptive pleaders
The difference between overall accuracy for truthful (M = 55.2%; SD = 16.64) and
deceptive pleaders (M = 49.87%, SD = 15.79) was significant, t(230) = 3.128, p = .002,
r = .20; observers were more accurate at identifying genuine than deceptive pleaders.
Subsequently, one-way ANOVAs were used to assess the influence of condition on
accuracy. The analysis for honest accuracy was significant, F(3, 227) = 6.82, p < .001,
partial g2p = .083, as was the analysis for deception accuracy, F(3, 227) = 2.91, p = .04,
g2p = .037. Follow-up analyses indicated that observers in the transcript-only condition
had a higher mean accuracy for honest pleaders than observers in all other conditions.
Analyses also indicated that the observers in the transcript-only condition had a signifi-
cantly lower mean accuracy for deceptive pleaders than the audio-only group. There were
no gender differences in overall accuracy, honest nor deceptive accuracy (all ps > .05).
Honest versus deceptive guesses
To assess observers’ potential evaluative biases, one-way ANOVAs were conducted with
the number of honest/deceptive guesses across condition. The analysis for honest guesses
Table 1. Detection accuracy across conditions
Measure
Transcript-only Audio-only Video-only Audio-video
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Overall accuracy (%) 54.10 10.08 52.81 9.65 51.97 9.96 51.24 9.33
Honest accuracy (%) 63.40 14.91 52.81 17.53 52.93 15.78 51.60 15.82
Deception accuracy (%) 44.83 16.36 52.88 15.09 50.84 16.05 50.95 14.81
Honest guesses 11.79 2.41 9.93 2.61 10.19 2.48 10.00 2.38
Deceptive guesses 8.19 2.41 9.95 2.62 9.76 2.47 9.81 2.42
1 Statistical significance for this, and all reported analyses, was assessed using the Bonferroni adjustment feature on SPSS
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was significant, F(3, 227) = 7.39, p < .001, g2p = .089, such that the observers in the
transcript-only condition identified pleaders as honest more often than those in all other
conditions. The analysis for deceptive guesses also was significant, F(3, 227) = 6.49,
p < .001, g2p = .079, and revealed the inverse of the previous analysis, that observers in
the transcript-only condition identified pleaders as deceptive less often than those in all
other conditions.
Elicited emotions/indirect lie detection
First, overall mean levels of emotions elicited for honest versus deceptive pleaders were
compared (see Table 2 for means) using paired sample t tests; results indicated that the
means for each of the seven emotions were not significantly different, ps > .05. That is,
overall observers experienced similar emotional reactions to both honest and deceptive
pleaders.
Next, to test the remaining two hypotheses, the influence of pleader veracity (H2) or
presentation modality (H3) on the emotional reactions of observers was examined. To do
so, seven 2 (honest/deceptive) 9 4 (audio-video/audio/video/transcript)mixedANOVAs
with emotional reaction as the dependent variable were conducted (see Table 2 for
means). Therewas amain effect of presentationmodality for happiness, F(3, 227) = 2.17,
p = .09, g2p = .028, with post-hoc analyses indicating that observers in the transcript
condition had a higher level of elicited happiness than those in the audiovisual condition.
For sadness, there was a significant interaction between veracity and presentation
modality, Wilks k = .944, F(3, 226) = 4.47, p = .005, g2p = .056. In the transcript-only
condition observers reported experiencing elevated levels of sadness, t(57) = 3.03,
p = .004, for honest versus deceptive pleaders. Themain effect for presentationmodality
also was significant, F(3, 226) = 3.01, p = .031, g2p = .038. However, post-hoc analyses
indicated no significant differences between the four modalities.
There was a significant interaction between veracity and presentation modality for
sympathy,Wilks k = .953, F(3, 226) = 3.733, p = .012,g2p = .047. In the transcript-only
condition, observers reported experiencing elevated levels of sympathy, t(57) = 2.48,
p = .016, for honest versus deceptive pleaders. Themain effect of presentationmodalities
was significant, F(3, 226) = 4.424, p = .005, g2p = .055. Post-hoc analyses revealed that
the transcript group had a significantly higher level of sympathy than the video-only
group. For fear, there was a significant interaction between veracity and presentation
modality, Wilks k = .948, F(3, 226) = 4.173, p = .007, g2p = .052. In the transcript-only
condition, observers reported experiencing elevated levels of fear, t(57) = 3.05,
p = .003, for honest versus deceptive pleaders. There were no significant results for
reactions of disgust, anger, or surprise.
Discussion
Individuals relaying high-stakes lies exhibit different observable verbal and non-verbal
cues than those who are genuine. This study sought to determine whether (1) observers
are able to accurately identify such high-stakes lies explicitly, (2) themanner inwhich the
stories are communicated influences accuracy, and (3) indirect measures of lie detection
relating to observer emotional responses may have validity. Overall, our sample
distinguished liars from truth-tellers slightly but significantly above the level of chance
(52.5%), fully in line with previous findings with various types of lower stakes lies (see
Bond & DePaulo, 2006).
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Although we had hypothesized that observers would explicitly detect lies most
accurately in the media-lean modalities (transcript-only and/or audio-only), presentation
modality overall did not exert any influence. Similar results have been found for the
influence of modality on the assessment of true and false descriptions of emotional
memories (Porter et al., 2002). Despite a lack of overall differences across modality,
observerswere better at identifying truthful pleaders thandeceptive pleaders, particularly
in the transcript-only condition. This likely was due to observers in the transcript
condition exhibiting a truth bias, categorizingmore pleaders as honest than deceptive. As
this truth-bias had a direct impact on accuracy of veracity evaluations, it is important to
consider the reasons that transcript-only observers were more likely to endorse this bias.
We think that the lack of observable emotional cues present in the transcripts may have
resulted in less of an emotional reaction (speculated to be an unconscious assessment of
veracity) to the clips, reducing the observers’ suspicion of the pleaders. Indeed, observers
in the visual conditions reported significantly lower levels of elicited happiness than
observers in the transcript-only condition from clips that typically are subjectively
distressing. Similarly, the transcript condition was associated with significantly increased
levels of sympathy for both honest and deceptive pleaders. This suggests that the
transcriptsmay not provide sufficient cues for observers to assess emotional sincerity, and
because they are not able to use emotional cues to distinguish liars from truth-tellers, they
are less distressed, experience more sympathy for all pleaders, and in turn are more likely
to fall back on the default honesty bias found among human observers more generally
(Bond & DePaulo, 2006).
These findings did not support the MRT (Daft & Lengel, 1986) in the context of
deception detection, which suggests that media-rich presentation modalities (e.g.,
audiovisual clips) would bemore useful thanmedia-leanmodalities (e.g., transcript-only).
Nor was the notion that media-rich presentations would overwhelm the cognitive
resources of observers, leading to impaired performance relative to media-lean presen-
tations (e.g., Rockwell & Singleton, 2007). Instead, all modalities were associated with
mediocre performance at lie detection, and transcript-only observers simply were more
trusting of the stories they heard relative to other observers.
Next, whether sincere and deceptive emotions might unconsciously elicit differing
emotional responses in our observers, despite their mediocre performance at assessing
the honesty of the pleaders explicitly, was examined. It was hypothesized that truthful
emotional communication (particularly accompanied by a visual component) might
unconsciously elicit stronger negative emotional responses in observers versuswhen they
perceived a deceptive story, a possible form of unconscious lie detection. This prediction
was only partially supported, in that differences in emotional reaction only emerged
according to modality. In the transcript-only condition, observers reported experiencing
greater sadness, sympathy, and fear to honest versus deceptivepleaders. Thismay indicate
that observers intuitively perceived the true emotional content of genuine pleas from
language alone. However, this did not lead to overall better explicit judgments of honesty,
as they continued to rely on a truth bias.
In real life, observers of the types of high-stakes messages used as stimuli in this study
typically are perceived via an audiovisualmedium. That is, the police, familymembers and
public watch and listen to a public plea for a missing person. As such, we were especially
interested in determining whether observers in the audiovisual condition would benefit
from indirect lie detection measures. Indeed, we found that these observers reported
overall increased feelings of sympathy for honest rather than deceptive pleaders, despite
their poor performance via explicit evaluations of honesty. This is in line with mounting
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evidence that has demonstrated that regardless of method of indirect lie detection (e.g.,
implicit association task, semantic classification, and nowemotional reaction) humans are
superior at indirect rather than direct deception detection (Albrechtsen et al., 2009;
Hartwig & Bond, 2011; ten Brinke et al., 2014). Together, this offers the tantalizing
possibility that humans successfully evaluate non-verbal and verbal emotional commu-
nication unconsciously but that this evaluation is then sabotaged by a reliance on
stereotypical cues to deception and fail to achieve accurate conscious, explicit assessment
of honesty (see Hartwig & Bond, 2011; ten Brinke et al., 2014).
A number of limitations in this study should be noted. First, despite collecting data
from a large sample of participants (N = 60 in each condition) a post-hoc power analysis
revealed that the testing had low levels of power (.25) and a larger sample in each
condition would be necessary to find more nuanced effects and reach the desired power
level of 0.80. Future research should use larger samples, and also include varying sample
groups (e.g., police officers, judges). Second, future research should continue to explore
the role of modality in deception detection. For example, considering the degree of
cognitive load required for evaluations of each modality, and whether varying types of
video presentations (e.g., images of face vs. full body) influence deception detection
accuracy. Finally, the results may not be applicable across all types of high-stakes,
emotional lies. For example, an individual who issues a public plea for a missing family
member may exhibit different emotional clues to deception than someone who is being
interrogated for a heinous crime. As such, continued research on deception detection
across lies in various contexts is warranted.
Enhancing the detection of high-stakes lies is relevant in various legal and security
settings. Despite the wealth of observable cues available in the video-based clips that
might enhance a lie-catchers’ ability to discriminate between the truth and lies, the results
of this study suggest that there is little relationship between the manner in which a lie is
presented to an observer and the accuracy of detecting deception. On the other hand,
observers reading a transcript were more trusting and showed a truth-bias in their
evaluations of the high-stakes pleas relative to other modalities, suggesting that this
modality does not provide sufficient emotional cues to achieve an accurate conclusion.
Despite the legal community’s wish to reduce the number of miscarriages of justice
related to faulty evaluations of deception in the courtroom, this study suggests that the use
of transcripts-onlymay diminish an observer’s (e.g., judge, juries) ability to properly assess
emotionswhich results in a truth-bias, ultimately culminating in decisions as inaccurate as
those based on flawed demeanour evidence. The results also suggest that indirect
measures of lie detection involving observers’ emotional reactions to a target’s tale may
offer validity not conferred via explicit assessments of honesty.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions of Dr. Leanne ten Brinke. This
project was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
(SSHRC).
References
Albrechtsen, J. S., Meissner, C. A., & Susa, K. J. (2009). Can intuition improve deception detection
performance? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 1052–1055. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.
2009.05.017
10 Crystal Evanoff et al.
Anderson, D., DePaulo, B. M., & Ansfield, M. E. (2002). The development of deception detection
skill: A longitudinal study of same-sex friends. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28,
536–545. doi:10.1177/0146167202287010
Black, P. J., Woodworth, M., & Porter, S. (2014). The big bad wolf? The relation between the Dark
Triad and the interpersonal assessment of vulnerability. Personality and Individual
Differences, 67, 52–56. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2013.10.026
Bond, C. F. Jr., & DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of deception judgments. Personality and Social
Psychology Review, 10, 214–234. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_2
Burgoon, J. K., Blair, J., & Strom, R. E. (2008). Cognitive biases and nonverbal cue availability in
detecting deception. Human Communication Research, 34, 572–599. doi:10.1111/j.
1468-2958.2008.00333.x
Daft, R. L., & Lengel, R. H. (1986). Organizational information requirements, media richness and
structural design. Management Science, 32, 554–571. doi:10.1287/mnsc.32.5.554
Davis, M., Markus, K. A., & Walters, S. B. (2006). Judging the credibility of criminal suspect
statements: Does mode of presentation matter? Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 30, 181–198.
doi:10.1007/s10919-006-0016-0
Dennis, A. R., & Kinney, S. T. (1998). Testingmedia richness theory in the newmedia: The effects of
cues, feedback, and task equivocality. Information SystemsResearch,9, 256–274. doi:10.1287/
isre.9.3.256
DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J., Malone, B. E., Muhlenbruck, L., Charlton, K., & Cooper, H.
(2003). Cues to deception. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 74–118. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.
129.1.74
Ekman, P. (2003). Darwin, deception, and facial expression. Annals of the New York Academy of
Sciences, 1000, 205–221. doi:10.1196/annals.1280.010
Ekman, P., & O’Sullivan, M. (1991). Who can catch a liar? American Psychologist, 46, 913–920.
doi:10.1037/0003-066X.46.9.913
Frank, M. G., & Ekman, P. (1997). The ability to detect deceit generalizes across different types of
high-stake lies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 1429–1439. doi:10.1037/
0022-3514.72.6.1429
Furnham, A., Benson, I., &Gunter, B. (1987).Memory for television commercials as a function of the
channel of communication. Social Behavior, 2, 105–112.
Gilman, S. C.,&Turner, J.W. (2001).Media richness and social informationprocessing: Rationale for
multifocal continuing medical education activities. Journal of Continuing Education in the
Health Professions, 21, 134–139. doi:10.1002/chp.1340210303
Granhag, P.-A. (2006). Rethinking implicit lie detection. Journal of Credibility Assessment and
Witness Psychology, 7, 180–190.
Hartwig, M., & Bond, C. F. (2011). Why do lie-catchers fail? A lens model meta-analysis of human lie
judgments. Psychological Bulletin, 137, 643–659. doi:10.1037/a0023589
Levine, T. R., Serota, K. B., Shulman, H., Clare, D.D., Park, H., Shaw, A. S., . . . Lee, J. H. (2011). Sender
demeanor: Individual differences in sender believability have a powerful impact on deception
detection judgments. Human Communication Research, 37, 377–403. doi:10.1111/j.
1468-2958.2011.01407.x
Mann, S., Vrij, A., & Bull, R. (2004). Detecting true lies: Police officers’ ability to detect suspects’ lies.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 89, 137–149. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.89.1.137
Mann, S., Vrij, A., Fisher, R. P., & Robinson, M. (2008). See no lies, hear no lies: Differences in
discrimination accuracy and response bias when watching or listening to police suspect
interviews. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 22, 1062–1071. doi:10.1002/acp.1406
Newman, M. L., Pennebaker, J. W., Berry, D. S., & Richards, J. M. (2003). Lying words: Predicting
deception from linguistic styles. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 665–675.
doi:10.1177/0146167203029005010
Nunnally, J. C., & Bernstein, I. H. (1994). Psychometric theory (3rd ed.) New York, NY:
McGraw-Hill.
Detecting high-stakes lies 11
O’Sullivan, M., Frank, M. G., Hurley, C. M., & Tiwana, J. (2009). ‘Police lie detection accuracy: The
effect of lie scenario’: Erratum. Law and Human Behavior, 33, 542–543. doi:10.1007/
s10979-009-9191-y
Porter, S., Campbell, M., Stapleton, J., & Birt, A. R. (2002). The influence of judge, target, and
stimulus characteristics on the accuracy of detecting deceit. Canadian Journal of Behavioural
Science, 34, 172–185. doi:10.1037/h0087170
Porter, S., & ten Brinke, L. (2009). Dangerous decisions: A theoretical framework for understanding
how judges assess credibility in the courtroom. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 14, 119–
134. doi:10.1348/135532508X281520
Purdy, J. M., Nye, P., & Balakrishnan, P. S. (2000). The impact of communication media on
negotiation outcomes. International Journal of Conflict Management, 11, 162–187. doi:10.
1108/eb022839
Rockwell, S. C., & Singleton, L. A. (2007). The effect of the modality of presentation of streaming
multimedia on information acquisition. Media Psychology, 9, 179–191. doi:10.1080/
15213260709336808
Salomon,G.,& Leigh, T. (1984). Predispositions about learning from, print and television. Journal of
Communication, 34, 119–135. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.1984.tb02164.x
Shaw, J., Porter, S., & ten Brinke, L. (2013). Catching liars: Training mental health and legal
professionals to detect high-stakes lies. Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology, 24, 145–
159. doi:10.1080/14789949.2012.752025
ten Brinke, L., & Porter, S. (2012). Cry me a river: Identifying the behavioral consequences of
extremely high-stakes interpersonal deception. Law and Human Behavior, 36, 469–477.
doi:10.1037/h0093929
ten Brinke, L., Porter, S., & Baker, A. (2012). Darwin the detective: Observable facial muscle
contractions reveal emotional high-stakes lies. Evolution and Human Behavior, 33, 411–416.
doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2011.12.003
ten Brinke, L., Stimson, D., & Carney, D. R. (2014). Some evidence for unconscious lie detection.
Psychological Science, 25, 1098–1105. doi:10.1177/0956797614524421
Vrij, A. (2005). Criteria-based content analysis: A qualitative review of the first 37 studies.
Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 11, 3. doi:10.1037/1076-8971.11.1.3
Vrij, A., Edward, K., & Bull, R. (2001). Police officers’ ability to detect deceit: The benefit of indirect
deceptiondetectionmeasures. Legal andCriminological Psychology,6, 185–196. doi:10.1348/
135532501168271
Vrij, A., Fisher, R., Mann, S., & Leal, S. (2008). A cognitive load approach to lie detection. Journal of
Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 5, 39–43. doi:10.1002/jip.82
Vrij, A., Granhag, P. A., & Porter, S. (2010). Pitfalls and opportunities in nonverbal and verbal lie
detection. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 11, 89–121. doi:10.1177/
1529100610390861
Vrij, A., & Mann, S. (2001). Who killed my relative? Police officers’ ability to detect real-life
high-stakes lies. Psychology, Crime, & Law, 7, 119–132. doi:10.1080/10683160108401791
Vrij, A., Mann, S., Leal, S., & Fisher, R. (2010). ‘Look intomy eyes’: Can an instruction tomaintain eye
contact facilitate lie detection? Psychology, Crime & Law, 16, 327–348. doi:10.1080/
10683160902740633
Vrij, A., Mann, S., Robbins, E., & Robinson, M. (2006). Police officers ability to detect deception in
high stakes situations and in repeated lie detection tests. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20,
741–755. doi:10.1002/acp.1200
Walther, J. B. (2012). Interaction through technological lenses: Computer-mediated communication
and language. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 31, 397–414. doi:10.1177/
0261927X12446610
Received 21 June 2013; revised version received 5 June 2014
12 Crystal Evanoff et al.
